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Abstract We exploit European regulatory interventions to investigate the effects of sub-second 
periodic auctions on market quality under dark trading restrictions. The restrictions are linked 
to an observable increase in periodic auctions and an economically meaningful loss of liquidity. 
While periodic auctions ameliorate illiquidity, their effects are significantly less than those of 
the restrictions; therefore, the combined effects of periodic auctions’ increases and the 
restrictions are general declines in liquidity and informational efficiency. However, consistent 
with theory, periodic auctions are linked to reductions in adverse selection costs, thereby 
underscoring their potential to address latency arbitrage and the technological arms race. 
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…stop this nonsense by moving from continuous trading to frequent batch auctions. To 
human eyes trading will be essentially continuous, but the robots will effectively gather 
in a room every second (or 100ms, if that seems too glacial for the financial terminators) 
for a brief blind auction 
Financial Times, 21st February, 2014 
 
1. Introduction 
While a large number of market microstructure studies suggest that algorithmic and high 
frequency trading (AT and HFT) benefit market quality (see as examples, Brogaard et al., 2014; 
Harris, 2013; Hasbrouck and Saar, 2013; Hendershott et al., 2011; Ibikunle, 2018), several 
others report their tendency to induce extreme and destabilizing events, such as “flash crashes” 
(see as examples, Easley et al., 2011; Kirilenko et al., 2017; Ibikunle and Rzayev, 2020). Others 
note their propensity to induce a greater price impact on large institutional orders (see Putnins 
and Barbara, 2016). Raman et al. (2014) and Anand and Venkataraman (2016) also find that 
endogenous HFT liquidity providers destabilise markets during stressful periods. Two 
additional consequences of trading at high speeds are latency arbitrage, involving the 
exploitation of a trading time disparity between fast and slow traders (see Rzayev and Ibikunle, 
2019), and the technological arms race (see Diaz-Rainey et al., 2015), a negative externality-
inducing development (see Menkveld, 2014). 
Budish et al. (2015) argue that the technological arms race is a symptom of a flawed market 
design and they propose the frequent batch auctions (FBA)/sub-second periodic auctions 
mechanism (hereafter referred to as periodic auctions), which divides trading into intervals of 
very short lengths, for example, every tenth of a second, as an antidote. In effect, this treats 
time as discrete instead of continuous and orders are processed in a batch auction rather than 
serially. While frequent batch auctions are not yet widely used globally, according to the UK’s 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), periodic auctions have recently experienced two 
significant spurts of growth due to the implementation of the provisions of the EU’s Markets 
in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) II. Although periodic auctions account for less than 
5% of the average trading volume in UK markets during the MiFID II era, the mechanism’s 
significance has recently become apparent. This results from the commencement of the double 
volume cap (DVC) measure, a MiFID II provision designed to restrict dark trading in European 
markets (see Ibikunle et al., 2019 for a detailed discussion of the DVC), in place since early 
2018. Evidence suggests that a non-negligible portion of volumes, otherwise destined for dark 
pools in stocks under the DVC restriction, are executed through periodic auctions and other 
non-continuous trading mechanisms, the so-called ‘quasi-dark’ mechanisms (see Johann et al., 
2019).  
In recognition of their relevance, the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) 
called for evidence of the effects of periodic auctions on market quality.1 However, there have 
been very limited attempts to investigate the direct market quality effects of periodic auctions 
as a trading mechanism thus far. In addition, if periodic auctions are to serve as a means of 
addressing the twin issues of latency arbitrage and the technological arms race, they must be 
shown to, at a minimum, have a benign or positive effect on market quality. Therefore, in this 
study, we investigate the effects of periodic auctions on market quality characteristics in 
Europe’s most active equity market, the UK market.  
In line with Johann et al. (2019), we find that stocks experiencing DVC-imposed dark 
trading restrictions experience higher periodic auctions volumes and that the overall market 
quality effects of periodic auctions on the market are limited and mixed. Specifically, we find 
that periodic auctions have a generally positive effect on liquidity and a largely benign effect 
on adverse selection costs, except in the case of the most liquid stocks, where adverse selection 
declines with the use of periodic auctions. The adverse selection costs effect is explained by 
the predictions of Budish et al. (2015): periodic auctions offer a safe haven for slower traders 
who are susceptible to the latency arbitrage strategies deployed by faster traders. Thus, 
increasing use of periodic auctions lowers the incidence of slower traders being adversely 
selected, especially through the latency arbitrage strategy typically deployed by HFTs. The 
mixed nature of the evidence uncovered is underscored by the estimated impact of periodic 
auctions on informational efficiency. The overall effect of periodic auctions trading, especially 
during the DVC window, is a deviation from a random walk or reduction in informational 
efficiency. This finding is consistent with periodic auctions slowing down the price discovery 
process. While trading in dark pools implies a degree of delay (as in Menkveld et al., 2017; 
                            
1  The ESMA report calling for evidence can be accessed here: 
https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/esma70-156-
785_call_for_evidence_periodic_auctions_for_equity_instruments.pdf  
Zhu, 2014), periodic auctions in an otherwise high frequency trading environment will 
inevitably slow down trading. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to provide empirical evidence on the 
market quality implications of periodic auctions in European markets. Although Johann et al. 
(2019) include periodic auctions in their list of ‘quasi-dark’ trading mechanisms, the 
identification of periodic auctions mechanisms as quasi-dark is slightly problematic given that 
a key feature of auctions is transparency – specifically, the fact that all orders are reflected in 
the observable indicative auction price and volume as they arrive in the market and prior to 
uncrossing. European exchanges, such as Cboe, also claim that the orders submitted to their 
periodic auctions mechanisms are sent to lit order books as they arrive. Our paper also isolates 
the effects of periodic auctions on market quality characteristics, while controlling for volumes 
attributed to other trading mechanisms. 
In general, deploying latency arbitrage-based trading strategies is more suited to a 
fragmented market environment given the likelihood of disparities in reaction times among 
different venues (Wah and Wellman, 2013). However, HFT makes these viable strategies within 
a single venue because it allows for a significant difference in the trading speeds of slow and 
fast traders (Menkveld, 2014; Wah and Wellman, 2016). By doing so, according to Aquilina et 
al. (2017b), HFT imposes adverse selection costs on slower traders (see also Rzayev and 
Ibikunle, 2019). The quest for faster trading speeds has resulted in the technological arms race, 
a competition driven by investment in hardware and software (see Biais and Woolley, 2011). 
Both are sustained by fast traders’ need for the retention of their speed advantage over slow 
traders and the pursuit of parity or the eclipsing of fast traders by the slow traders. Menkveld 
(2014) argues that the arms race raises the spectre of negative externality and waste in financial 
markets. Thus, if the importance of speed is reduced, the activities driving the arms race and 
latency arbitrage should decline, consequently leading to a reduction in both phenomena. The 
FBA, as proposed by Budish et al. (2015), could significantly reduce the influence of speed on 
the price discovery process. This could shift investor focus from the acquisition of speed-
enabling transactions to obtaining better prices, implying that the introduction of an FBA-type 
mechanism could offer price efficiency (see Madhavan, 1992).  
Cboe’s periodic auction mechanism, which was introduced on 19th October 2015 and 
currently accounts for about 70% of the periodic auction volume in Europe, is largely consistent 
with the structure of the FBA proposed by Budish et al. (2015). Its auction book provides both 
pre-trade and post-trade transparency, thus meeting MiFID II’s regulatory technical standards 
(RTS). Although periodic auctions have been the subject of some academic studies, they have 
only focused on long interval auction lengths and not the FBA-type periodic auctions we 
examine in the context of AT/HFT. For example, Madhavan (1992) argues that periodic 
auctions offer greater price efficiency than the more common continuous order-driven trading 
mechanism. This is due to the pooling effect of the periodic auctioning system, allowing for 
simultaneous execution. The pooling of orders for simultaneous execution addresses the 
problem of information asymmetry that the sequential trading system of the continuous order-
driven trading mechanism induces (see also Barclay et al., 2008). The simultaneous executions 
in classical auctions could also positively affect the pricing process when they are deployed in 
conjunction with continuous order-driven trading. Amihud et al. (1997) show that an iterated 
continuous trading process preceded by a call auction on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange is linked 
to improvements in the price discovery process. 
Evidence from other studies that broadly examine the implications of call auctions for 
market quality characteristics is more nuanced. Sarkar (2016) investigates midday auctions at 
the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and reports that the use of the mechanism is linked to a 
larger spread and increased price volatility. However, the most common use of call auctions in 
financial markets is as market opening or closing mechanisms, and this has been the focus of 
a stream of literature (see as examples, Bellia et al., 2020; Chang et al., 2008; Cordi et al., 2015; 
Ibikunle, 2015). For example, Barclay et al. (2008) and Chang et al. (2008) report on the 
positive effects of the use of the opening call auction for market opening. Opening call auctions 
can help market participants build a consensus on an opening price ahead of the continuous 
trading phase, and thus offer informational efficiency benefits. The work of Barclay et al. (2008) 
and Chang et al. (2008) nevertheless contrasts with the findings of Ibikunle (2015), who reports 
a high rate of failure to open, and low levels of informational efficiency for low volume stocks 
on the LSE when compared to the levels of informational efficiency recorded for the continuous 
trading period. The study also finds that although the closing call auction offers higher 
informational efficiency levels than the opening call auction, it is still lower than the continuous 
trading phase attains. This finding is linked to the fact that the advantages of transparency and 
liquidity the call auction offers cannot necessarily be regarded as such in an era where HFT 
guarantees high levels of trading activity during the continuous trading phase of the market. 
Cordi et al. (2015) find positive links between market quality characteristics and the use 
of the closing call auction, while Comerton-Forde et al. (2007) argue that the use of the closing 
call auction could reduce price manipulation. Chelley-Steeley (2008) and Chelley-Steeley 
(2009) in turn investigate the market quality impact of the introduction of the closing auction 
on the LSE. Both studies report market quality improvements. These findings are consistent 
with those of Pagano and Schwartz (2003) and Comerton-Forde et al. (2007), who examine the 
introduction of the closing auction on the Paris Bourse and the Singapore Stock Exchange 
respectively. Thus, with the exception of the evidence from the LSE (for smaller stocks), there 
appears to be a consensus in the literature on the links between the deployment of the call 
auctions and market quality characteristics. This may have implications for the use of periodic 
auctions at high frequency. 
Finally, more recently, using data from the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TWSE) Indriawan et 
al. (2020) investigate a transition from batch auctions to continuous trading and find that the 
move is linked to an increase in adverse selection and a liquidity decline. Our study differs 
from theirs in at least two respects. The first relates to significant market structure differences: 
while they focus on a transition from batch auctions to continuous trading, we investigate an 
event that should lead to an increased use of periodic auctions within a hybrid trading system. 
Second, TWSE’s batch auctions are distinct from the periodic auctions we examine in that the 
former operates five-second interval auctions, while the periodic auctions systems we examine 
operate maximum intervals of 100 milliseconds.  
 
2. Background 
2.1. Periodic auctions and market quality: the literature and hypotheses 
Although periodic auctions are mainly discussed in the context of addressing the 
technological arms race and its potential welfare externalities (see Menkveld, 2014), its 
deployment should first be viewed in less ambitious terms. This is because the overriding 
question when designing markets is that of the system of exchange, specifically, how the 
decision could either enhance or hinder the evolution of market quality characteristics, such as 
liquidity and informational efficiency. Periodic auction trading systems are structurally distinct 
from the other auction types that have been studied extensively in the literature. Firstly, periodic 
auctions have smaller intervals; Budish et al. (2015) suggest that the interval should be smaller 
than one second and, in line with this, the leading global system operated by Cboe provides 
100ms-level auction intervals. Secondly, periodic auctions are typically conducted alongside 
continuous trading, and currently the volume of periodic auctions only captures a small amount 
of the total volume in the market. Therefore, trading in periodic auctions might be more 
influenced by the market’s main trading system than vice versa. Thirdly, the main aim of 
periodic auctions has thus far been to de-emphasise the influence of speed in trading, i.e. the 
activities of HFT, while opening and closing call auctions aim to provide more efficient prices.  
There are limited existing studies on periodic auctions. An FCA (2018) investigation of 
the growth of periodic auctions in UK stocks finds little difference in growth between stocks 
experiencing dark trading caps and those that are not. Johann et al. (2019) investigate the shift 
of dark pool volume to other non-continuous trading mechanisms following the imposition of 
dark trading restrictions on some stocks. They find that only a small proportion of the hitherto 
dark volume shift into such markets, including periodic auctions. They also find limited 
changes in overall market quality. Aquilina et al. (2017b) investigation of the impact of periodic 
auctions on adverse selection costs is limited by the fact that it is based on a small pre-MiFID 
II sample and volume. Thus, the effects of periodic auctions remain largely unexplored and 
unclear in the empirical literature, which underscores the ESMA call for more evidence given 
the concerns of various stakeholders (see McDowell, 2019). 
INSERT FIGURE 1 AND FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Figure 1 provides clear evidence of the above-noted spurts of growth in periodic auctions 
volume (Panel A), currency volume (Panel B) and transactions (Panel C) in UK stocks since 
the start of the MiFID II regulatory era. The growth also appears to be due to the migration of 
trading from other trading mechanisms (see Figure 2). However, the overall picture presented 
in Figure 1 and by the FCA (2018) fails to account for the differences in the growth of periodic 
auctions in stocks experiencing dark trading restrictions and those that are not. Nevertheless, it 
is logical to expect that there would be a difference in the periodic auctions volume growth 
trajectories for stocks facing dark trading restrictions and those that are not. Therefore, we 
propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Following the implementation of the DVC, stocks with DVC-imposed dark 
trading restrictions will experience a higher periodic auctions volume when compared to those 
with no DVC-related restrictions.  
The implementation of the DVC might lead to the shift of hitherto dark trading volume to 
quasi-dark markets, including the periodic auction book (see Johann et al., 2019). 
Our next few hypotheses relate to the market quality effects of periodic auctions. The call 
auction is widely employed as an opening and closing mechanism in financial markets, with 
implications for market quality during the continuous trading period. Indeed, Ibikunle (2015) 
identifies distinctions in the effects of the call auction depending on its positioning relative to 
the continuous trading period and the activeness of the stocks (see also Cao et al., 2000; Jiang 
et al., 2012; Chang et al., 2008; Cordi et al., 2015). Therefore, it is rational to expect that 
periodic auctions interact with the continuous trading mechanism when deployed concurrently, 
and that this has implications for market quality. However, since market quality characteristics, 
such as liquidity, are functions of trading activity (see Chordia et al., 2001; Chordia et al., 2008), 
these implications are likely linked to periodic auctions volume. Although periodic auctions 
were deployed in European markets prior to the MiFID II era, as shown in Figure 2, they 
captured only a very small percentage of the overall daily market volume before the 
implementation of MiFID II, less than 0.1% of the total trading volume (see FCA, 2018; Cboe, 
2020). The implementation of MiFID II provisions, especially the imposition of the DVC dark 
trading restrictions, changed this, leading to a substantial growth in period auctions volume, as 
seen in Figure 1. 
The above suggests that the potential effects of periodic auctions on market quality 
characteristics are more likely to be empirically evidenced following the implementation of 
MiFID II provisions, i.e. a period with relatively sufficient volumes. The crucial question here 
is whether more periodic auctions enhances or impairs market quality characteristics. Given 
the evolution of periodic auctions around the DVC implementation, the market quality effects 
of any changes in the volume of periodic auctions could be linked to the effects of dark trading 
restrictions. Ibikunle et al. (2019) find that MiFID II dark trading halts are linked to a general 
decline in market quality, while Johann et al. (2019) find that the market quality effects of any 
MiFID-II-induced shift in trading volume from dark to other venues is negligible. Therefore, it 
is useful to employ a framework that distinguishes the effects of periodic auctions on market 
quality characteristics while controlling for the effects of the DVC. Liquidity and informational 
efficiency are crucial characteristics that indicate the quality of the trading process. While an 
implementation of the DVC is expected to adversely impact liquidity in the affected stocks 
(Ibikunle et al., 2019), periodic auctions should alleviate some of the liquidity constraints the 
DVC’s implementation imposes. Information might also be released in a timelier manner when 
traders migrate from dark pools to more transparent trading mechanisms, such as periodic 
auctions. An improvement in transparency could inform an improvement in the price discovery 
process through the formation of more efficient prices, which in turn could encourage the 
submission of more orders and liquidity improvements in the aggregate market (see Amihud et 
al., 1997; Madhavan, 1992; Bloomfield et al., 2015). Therefore, we propose the following 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2: The implementation of the DVC impairs liquidity for stocks with dark trading 
restrictions. 
Hypothesis 3: An increase in periodic auctions alleviates the liquidity constraints induced by 
DVC implementation.     
The argument with regard to the effects of periodic auction on liquidity related to DVC 
implementation is linked to transparency, i.e. the dynamics of a component of the spread and 
adverse selection costs. In the classical call auctions literature, congregating all available 
market liquidity at a single point for price determination purposes is a central theoretical 
argument. Schwartz (2012) asserts that doing so enhances the accuracy of the price discovery 
process, while Madhavan (1992) argues that since all traders are given access to the same prices 
at the same time, call auctions reduce information asymmetry. Schnitzlein (1996) also finds 
that there is a reduction in adverse selection costs incurred by uninformed traders under a call 
auction. Therefore, the structural similarities between the periodic auction and the call auction 
lead us to expect periodic auctions to be negatively related to adverse selection costs: 
Hypothesis 4: Periodic auctions are negatively linked to adverse selection costs. 
With respect to the DVC itself, the implementation of a dark trading halt in stocks will 
force a transfer of slow traders from dark pools to more transparent ones using trading 
mechanisms, such as continuous and periodic auctions (see Johann et al., 2019). An increase 
in the volume of slow (uninformed) traders in lit venues, or at least less dark venues, will lessen 
the concentration of informed traders in these venues, resulting in lower risk of uninformed 
traders being adversely selected by informed or faster ones at more transparent venues: 
Hypothesis 5: The implementation of the DVC leads to a reduction in adverse selection costs.  
Although the implementation of the DVC implies a shift of trading activity from dark to 
more transparent venues, the overall impact of periodic auctions on informational efficiency is 
likely to be a weakness. This is because, while trading in dark pools signifies a degree of delay 
due to informed traders facing higher non-execution risk (see Zhu, 2014) and execution delays 
(see Menkveld et al., 2017) than in more transparent venues, periodic auctions are intentionally 
designed to slow down trading, and often to counter the effects of speed in trading. Therefore, 
one anticipated effect of an increased use of periodic auctions on the price discovery process 
is making it less efficient, i.e. the price formation process becomes slower: 
Hypothesis 6: Periodic auctions are negatively linked to informational efficiency. 
 
2.2. Periodic auctions in Europe 
 Cboe launched its periodic auctions trading mechanism in October 2015, using both the 
BXE and DXE order books. The stated aim of the periodic auctions book is to provide a trading 
environment with reduced emphasis on speed, instead enhancing the importance of price. 
Periodic auctions orders at Cboe are accepted from 08:00 to 16:30 London time during trading 
days. Combined orders are not allowed in the submitting processes, meaning that orders in 
different directions must be submitted separately. Auctions are also conducted continuously 
and consecutively throughout the trading day. Traders are able to submit market, limit and 
pegged orders in the books accepting periodic auctions orders. Orders with the so-called 
minimum acceptable quantity (MAQ) rule are also accepted. MAQ orders are only executable 
when the referenced MAQ size is fulfilled. In contrast to the FBA design envisaged by Budish 
et al. (2015), the duration of each auction is randomized, however, it is less than the maximum 
limit, which is 100ms. Each auction is split into two stages. The first is the price determination 
stage, when the auction price is formed; the second is the execution allocation stage. To 
determine the auction prices, four criteria must be met: naming maximum executable volume, 
minimum surplus, market pressure and reference price. The most important point here is 
ensuring that, for each auction, the mechanism selects the equilibrium price where the executed 
volume is maximised. The basis of ‘price/size/time’ is followed during the price determination 
process; this means that the importance of price is directly enhanced in the auctions. 
Furthermore, in order to ensure an orderly price formation process, the EBBO (European best 
bid and offer) collar is introduced. By ensuring that the auction prices fall within the collar, this 
move protects against the auction prices, leading to best execution issues. 
During the order allocation process, orders in Cboe periodic auctions, the allocation 
priority order is ‘broker (optional)/price/size/time’. The broker preference feature is optional 
and refers to single broker paired transactions. The feature supports attracting broker trading 
activity; according to Cboe data, broker priority orders have been contributing about 20% of 
total periodic auction volumes since 2018 Q2.2 In order to ensure that this feature does not 
interfere with price formation, it is only available at the execution stage. In line with MiFID II 
requirements, the Cboe periodic auctions book offers pre-trade transparency.3  
    The London Stock Exchange Group (LSEG) also recently introduced its own periodic 
auctions book called Turquoise Plato Lit Auctions, which has been in operation since 2017 Q4. 
Although the Turquoise periodic auctions book came into the market later than Cboe, it has a 
lot of the same features as the former, including order type, member/price priority,4 allocation, 
and price formation. However, the Turquoise auction interval is slightly different from that of 
Cboe. In Turquoise, the interval is divided into two parts: a 50-millisecond fixed interval and 
a randomized interval with a maximum 50-millisecond duration. Hence, the interval durations 
vary from 50 to 100 milliseconds. 
 
3. Data, variable construction, and descriptive statistics 
3.1. Sample, matching process, and data 
                            
2 Data obtained from Cboe shows that broker priority allocations account for 33.7%, 20.7%, 19.7%, 21.8%, 
22.1%, 24.8%, 22.4%, and 20.7% of the exchange’s periodic auctions volume for the eight quarters from 2018 
Q1 to 2019 Q4. 
3 See https://ec.europa.eu/finance/securities/docs/isd/mifid/rts/160714-rts-1-annex_en.pdf  
4 The Turquoise member priority has features similar to Cboe’s broker priority in allocation. 
We employ the constituents of the FTSE 250 index of stocks, which includes 250 of the 
largest 350 UK firms’ stocks as listed on the LSE. The decision to use the FTSE 250 stocks is 
driven by our empirical framework, which involves deploying two estimation approaches. The 
first is a difference-in-differences (DiD) framework used to estimate the relative evolution in 
periodic auctions trading activity in stocks affected by the DVC relative to those not affected. 
This approach requires the matching of the affected (treated) stocks with those that are 
unaffected (control stocks). The selection of the larger FTSE 100 stocks would have made 
pairing for a sufficient number of stocks impossible – given that a significant proportion of 
FTSE 100 stocks ran afoul of the DVC during our sample period – leading to unbalanced 
pairing. The second estimation approach is a standard panel estimation with stock and time 
fixed effects, and this is deployed to estimate the effects of the expected DVC-induced periodic 
auctions dynamics on market quality variables. For this part of the analysis, we expand the 
sample to include all DVC-affected FTSE 250 stocks during the sample period: 158 stocks. 
The sample period covers 3rd January 2018 to 29th June 2018, which includes a period of dark 
trading suspensions in a large number of FTSE 250 stocks in the first half of 2018 – the first 
round of suspensions under MiFID II was on 12th March 2018. 
For the DiD estimation, we first match the sample of DVC-affected stocks with those that 
are unaffected. Consistent with Shkilko and Sokolov (2020), we match every stock in the 
treated group with a stock with dark trading privileges using total volume, a liquidity proxy 
(relative spread) and information efficiency proxy (5-second autocorrelation of intraday stock 
returns) for the first empirical framework. We compute matching error for a given number of 
pairs as follows: 









𝑘=1                    (1) 
where 𝑐𝑘 corresponds to the matching criteria, including stock price, currency volume and 
market value, and 𝑖 and 𝑗 represent a pair of stocks. Variables are sampled no later than a 
month prior to announcement of the DVC suspensions in order to ensure that they are not 
directly influenced by the shock. The matching process yields 57 control stocks and 57 treated 
stocks. The success of the matching approach is underscored by the observation that the control 
and treated group of stocks are not economically or significantly (in statistical terms) different 
from one another with respect to the variables employed in the matching prior to 
implementation of the DVC (see Panel B of Table 2).  
Transactions in the periodic auctions of FTSE 250 stocks mainly occur at Turquoise and 
Cboe, with the two exchanges capturing more than 85% of the periodic auctions transactions 
in the market. Therefore, the intraday data we obtain for our sample of stocks includes trading 
activity recorded for the LSE, Turquoise and Cboe, containing data for all the trading 
mechanisms deployed on all three exchanges over the sample period. We also note that, based 
on aggregate trading data from Cboe, the three venues account for more than 95% of all trading 
activity in the FTSE 350 stocks. 
We obtain intraday time and sales tick data from the Thomson Reuters Tick History (TRTH) 
version 2 database. The dataset includes variables such as the Reuters Identification Code (RIC), 
qualifiers (identifying trade/order type/unique characteristics, such as whether a trade is 
executed in the dark or not), date, TRTH timestamp, exchange timestamp, price, volume, bid 
price, ask price, bid volume, ask volume, and bid and ask quotes. The exchange timestamp is 
critical given that we aim to aggregate data across different venues. This timestamp is different 
from the TRTH timestamp and is provided as part of the TRTH version 2 database. It allows us 
to observe the exact time each trading activity observation was recorded at each trading venue 
using the London local time; the local time is the same for all the exchanges represented in the 
data since all three venues are based in the same geographical location (London). We allocate 
each trade a pair of corresponding prevailing best bid and ask quotes based on the quotes 
submission information available in the TRTH database. We then merge the order book-level 
data for the three trading venues in order to create a single ‘global’ order book/venue for the 
London market. The 36.12 million transactions are valued at 203 billion British Pounds Sterling 
and executed in 215 stocks over the sample period. The full sample of stocks is listed in 
Appendix A. 
 
3.2. Market quality metrics 
In this section, we discuss our estimation of the market quality variables. All market quality 
variables are estimated using data from the continuous trading mechanism deployed by the 
main market for FTSE 250 stocks, the LSE’s Stock Exchange Electronic Trading Service 




                (2) 
where the 𝑚𝑖𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝜏 is the average of 𝑎𝑠𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝜏 and 𝑏𝑖𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝜏 for stock 𝑖 at 
time 𝜏, and 𝑎𝑠𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝜏 and 𝑏𝑖𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝜏 correspond to the ask and bid prices for stock 𝑖 
at time 𝜏.  𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑  is then computed as the daily volume-weighted value of 
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝜏 for stock 𝑖 on each day 𝑑. 
In addition to liquidity, we also proxy adverse selection cost as a component of the bid-ask 
spread. Adverse selection cost reflects the level of latency arbitrage in the market, and it is also 
employed by related studies, such as Aquilina et al. (2017b) and Shkilko and Sokolov (2020). 
The entrance of fast traders could potentially lead to losses for the liquidity supplier, because 
fast traders can react more rapidly to new information, thereby inducing latency arbitrage. In 
this situation, irrespective of their analytical abilities, faster traders will be the informed traders 
and slower traders will be the uninformed traders. In response to this exposure, liquidity 
suppliers are likely to expand the spread by imposing higher adverse selection costs, thereby 
protecting themselves from being adversely selected. This is in line with Budish et al. (2015) 
and Rzayev and Ibikunle (2019), who argue that latency arbitrage is a form of adverse selection. 
Therefore, the evolution of adverse selection in the market could be an indicator of changes in 
the use of latency arbitrage as a trading strategy caused by fast traders. We estimate adverse 
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where 𝑚𝑖,𝜏 is the midpoint price for stock 𝑖 at time 𝜏 and 𝑚𝑖,𝜏+15𝑠 is the midpoint price 
for stock 𝑖 at time 𝜏 + 15 seconds; the 15-second window is in line with existing studies, 
such as Conrad and Wahal (2020) and Shkilko and Sokolov (2020). 𝑞𝑖,𝜏 indicates the trade 
direction for stock 𝑖 at time 𝜏 and corresponds to +1 for buyer-initiated trades and -1 for  
seller-initiated ones; we use the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm to determine 𝑞𝑖,𝜏, setting the 
interval at 15-seconds. In the regression models, we employ daily volume-weighted estimates 
                            
5 Employing concatenated real-time transactions and price data across the three venues in our sample does not 
yield qualitatively different estimates.  
of 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝜏 for stock 𝑖 at day 𝑑; this is denoted as 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑑. 
Informational efficiency is an important market quality characteristic because it indicates 
the level of efficient incorporation of information into instrument prices. Therefore, we follow 
Boehmer et al. (2018), Ibikunle et al. (2019), and Foley and Putniņš (2016) in employing the 
absolute value of the autocorrelation of midpoint (average of the ask and bid prices) returns as 
a proxy for the test of informational efficiency. We estimate this proxy at the 5-second 
frequency and then aggregate across the day as a measure of short-term informational 
efficiency. Estimates close to zero indicate that the pricing process follows a random walk; 
hence, the market has a higher level of informational efficiency:  
𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑑 = |𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑑,𝑛, 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑑,𝑛−1)|    (4)        
𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑑 is the absolute value for the 5-second midpoint return autocorrelation 
for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑. In the formula, 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑑,𝑛 is the 𝑛th of the 5-second length midpoint 
return of stock 𝑖  on day 𝑑 , and 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑑,𝑛−1  is the (𝑛 − 1) th of the 5-second length 
midpoint return of stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑. Utilizing the absolute value of autocorrelation allows for 
easier capturing of both the under- and over-reaction of returns to information, with higher 
values suggesting lower efficiency. 
For robustness, we also employ an additional proxy for informational efficiency: variance 
ratio. According to Chordia et al. (2008) and Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2015), markets with 
higher levels of pricing efficiency should generate prices that follow the random walk, which 
suggests that variance should have a linear relation to return frequency. We estimate the 
measure, as outlined in Equation (5): 
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where 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑑 is the variance ratio for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑, and 𝜎𝑖,𝑑,1−𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑡𝑒
2  and 
𝜎𝑖,𝑑,5−𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑡𝑒
2  are the variance estimates of midpoint stock returns over 1 minute and 5 minutes 
respectively. In an efficient market, 𝜎𝑖,𝑑,5−𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑡𝑒
2  should be about five times the value of 
𝜎𝑖,𝑑,1−𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑡𝑒
2 . As an absolute value, 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑑 is equal to or larger than zero; higher 
values imply worse informational efficiency. 
  
3.3. Other variables 
The other variables work as proxies for periodic auctions and variables employed as 
controls in our models. Periodic auctions proxies include 𝑃𝐴𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑, 
𝑃𝐴𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑 and 𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑑 and they are defined as trading volume, 
currency value of traded volume and transactions of periodic auction books for stock 𝑖 on day 
𝑑 respectively. The constructed control variables include 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑, which is defined as the 
volume of all transactions using all non-periodic auctions trading mechanisms across 
exchanges where stock 𝑖 is traded on day 𝑑. 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑑 is the end-of-day close price of 
stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑, and 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑑 is the end-of-day market value of stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑. 
𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐼𝑚𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑑 is the proxy for order imbalance for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑 , computed as 
defined in Chordia et al. (2008), i.e. as the absolute value of the buyer-initiated volume for 
stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑 minus the amount of seller-initiated volume for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑 divided 
by the sum of buyer and seller-initiated volume for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑. 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑑 is the 
proxy for return volatility for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑, and this is calculated as the variance of 1-
minute intervals mid-price returns. 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑑 is a proxy for momentum for stock 𝑖 on 
day 𝑑, and this is estimated as the 3-day cumulative abnormal return on closing price. Table 1 
defines all the variables employed in our study. 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
3.4 Descriptive statistics 
Panel A of Table 2 presents the summary statistics for all the variables employed in the 
study. Mean and standard deviation estimates are presented for the full sample of stocks and 
stock terciles in terms of trading activity. A few estimates are of particular interest. Firstly, over 
the sample, the most active stocks appear to be more liquid. This is consistent with the literature 
on the links between trading activity and liquidity (see as an example, Chordia et al., 2001). 
Interestingly, however, the more active stocks appear to perform worse in terms of 
informational efficiency. This is perhaps linked to the fact that these stocks are also more likely 
to be traded via periodic auctions, which would suggest a measure of delay in order execution 
since batching needs to precede uncrossing during the auctions process. Secondly, the tendency 
for the more active stocks to be more likely to be traded via periodic auctions than the less 
active stocks is explained by the former being more likely to be traded via other off-main 
exchange trading facilities, such as dark pools, due to the need to avoid queues (see Ibikunle et 
al., 2019). 
Panel B of Table 2 reports the pre-DVC comparative estimates of the microstructure 
variables used in matching the stocks included in the DiD estimations (see Section 4.1). The 
estimates and statistical tests show minimal differences for all the variables and none of these 
differences are statistically significant at conventional levels. 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
4. Analysis, results and discussion 
4.1. Effects of dark trading bans on periodic auctions 
Our starting hypothesis is that the imposition of the DVC will lead to an increase in the 
volume of transactions executed via a periodic auction mechanism. Therefore, we begin by 
testing whether this dynamic is observed in the data. Our first examination of this question 
employs univariate analysis testing for differences in trading activity on either side of the DVC 
coming into effect. The results presented in Table 3 include estimates for nominal stock volume, 
currency volume and the number of transactions. The estimates are presented separately for the 
control and treated groups of stocks. In all cases there are statistically significant increases in 
trading activity following the DVC; however, the increases are far more pronounced for the 
treated stocks. This is unsurprising given that following the DVC, the treated stocks lose the 
opportunity to trade in dark pools – an increasingly popular trading mechanism. This is also 
consistent with the FCA (2018) and Johann et al. (2019) 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
While this univariate investigation is useful, it is important to control for the myriad of 
factors that could be driving the evolution of periodic auction volume. Hence, we construct the 
following DiD model to estimate how the imposition of DVC drives period auction trading 
activity in the affected stocks relative to the stocks that are directly unaffected by the DVC:  
𝑃𝐴𝑖,𝑑 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑉𝐶𝑑 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑉𝐶𝑑 × 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑑 +
𝛾𝑑𝑑 + 𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑑                                                 (6) 
where 𝑃𝐴𝑖,𝑑  corresponds to one of the log-formal periodic auctions proxies, i.e. 
𝑃𝐴𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑 , 𝑃𝐴𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑  and 𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑑 , for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑. 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 and 𝐷𝑉𝐶𝑑 are dummy variables. 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 is a proxy for whether stock 𝑖 is 
banned from dark trading or not; if yes, it takes the value of one, otherwise it is zero. 𝐷𝑉𝐶𝑑 is 
a proxy for whether DVC is deployed in the market or not on day 𝑑; it takes the value of one 
for 12th March 2018 and subsequent days in the sample, and zero otherwise. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑑 
contains a series of control variables for stock 𝑖  on day 𝑑 , including 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑 , 
𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑑 , 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑑 , 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐼𝑚𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑑 , 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑑 , 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑 
and 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑑 , all of which are as previously defined. Volume, which captures the 
trading volume from other trading mechanisms, is included because there is an expectation of 
interactions among the various trading mechanisms available to traders in the FTSE 250 stocks. 
Johann et al. (2019) report a shifting effect involving the continuous market and the so-called 
quasi-dark markets. 𝛿𝑖𝑖 and 𝛾𝑑𝑑 are stock and time fixed effects. The standard errors are 
robust to autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. 
Finally, it is essential that the parallel trend assumption holds in the case of the dependent 
variables, i.e. 𝑃𝐴𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑, 𝑃𝐴𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑 and 𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑑. In particular, 
the three variables need to have parallel trends in the treatment and control groups in the 
absence of an event.   
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 
Panels A, B and C in Figure 3 clearly show that the three variables employed in Equation (6) 
exhibit similar trends during the pre-treatment period and this is also confirmed by statistical 
tests. This implies that our treatment and control groups can be used in the DiD framework and 
our modeling approach satisfies the parallel trend assumption requirement. 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
Table 4 reports the regression results of Equation (6). Panels A, B and C present the results 
for models where the log of 𝑃𝐴𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑, 𝑃𝐴𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑 and 𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑑 
correspond to 𝑃𝐴𝑖,𝑑 in Equation (5) respectively. Each panel presents full sample estimates as 
well as estimates by terciles. 𝛽1, the DVC coefficient, is positive and statistically significant 
in all the panels with respect to each tercile and full sample estimations. The coefficient 
estimates are also economically meaningful; for example, the estimates for the full sample for 
trading volume, currency volume and number of transactions are 2.36, 3.38 and 1.23 
respectively and they are all statistically significant at the 0.01 level. These estimates indicate 
236%, 338% and 123% increases in periodic auctions trading volume, currency volume and 
number of transactions respectively for the event period relative to the period preceding the 
imposition of the DVC. The significance of these estimates is underscored by the fact that the 
volume of trading occurring via trading mechanisms other than periodic auctions is controlled 
for and highly statistically significant in each of the regression estimations. The estimates also 
suggest a rise in the average execution sizes of period auctions transactions. This is because, 
while the number of periodic auctions transactions increases during the event period, the 
relative increase is much lower than that observed for trading volume and currency trading 
volume. These observations are consistent in the cases of the terciles as well.  
However, there is an area of inconsistency when considering the terciles, and this affects 
the 𝛽2 estimates. While for the full sample and the highest and lowest terciles, the treated 
group of stocks are generally traded more via periodic auctions than the control stocks, this is 
not the case for the middle tercile. There is no obvious or theoretically relevant explanation for 
this. What is interesting and theoretically relevant, however, is that once the 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 
coefficient has interacted with the 𝐷𝑉𝐶𝑑 coefficient, the deficit is eliminated. This is in line 
with our expectation that the imposition of the DVC would increase the use of periodic auctions 
for the stocks it affects. Indeed, the 𝛽3 estimates are positive and statistically significant for 
both the full sample of stocks and for the terciles in all the three panels. This suggests that, on 
average, there are statistically significant increases in the use of periodic auctions as a trading 
mechanism in treated stocks following the imposition of the DVC when compared with the 
control stocks. These estimates are consistent with Johann et al. (2019), who find that the DVC 
induces migration of trading to quasi-dark venues. 
    There is another interesting observation to be noted here. 𝛽3 estimates are generally 
higher for the terciles than for the full sample, except in one notable, and consistent, instance 
– the largest group of stocks. This suggests that the effect of the DVC is weakest in large stocks. 
This phenomenon could be linked to the much higher proportions of dark trading activity 
typically observed among smaller stocks in the London market. In the London market, lower 
trading stocks are known to be frequently traded away from the downstairs continuous (lit) 
market, with most of their trades by value taking place in the ‘dark’ LSE-operated (upstairs) 
broker-dealer market (see Armitage and Ibikunle, 2015). In the LSE’s broker-dealer market, 
publishing of orders is not mandatory and executed orders can go unreported for up to three 
minutes, with only the order submitters and attending broker-dealers aware of their existence 
until reported. Thus, it appears that small UK stocks are mainly traded in opaque venues. For 
example, Armitage and Ibikunle (2015) find that more than 62% of the orders executed by 
value in the smallest FTSE 250 stocks are in the LSE’s broker-dealer market. This ‘dark’ 
trading facility can only remain an option for such stocks following DVC in the cases of 
disproportionately large orders. Therefore, when dark trading privileges are halted in small 
stocks, they are more likely than large stocks to pivot to using periodic auctions, a quasi-dark 
option. This explains the monotonic decline by stock size grouping in 𝛽3s observed in Table 
4. The estimates are larger in all three panels for the smallest stocks and lowest for the largest 
stocks.     
 
4.2. Periodic auctions and market quality 
4.2.1 Liquidity analysis 
We now investigate how changes in the levels of periodic auctions in stock affects its 
market quality-related characteristics, such as liquidity and informational efficiency. Since our 
focus is on estimating the effects of the increase in periodic auctions trading on market quality 
characteristics, rather than the comparative effects between stocks experiencing dark trading 
restrictions and those that are not, we estimate a fixed effects panel regression model. This also 
allows us to expand our sample size to 158 stocks with varying levels of periodic auction 
trading over the full sample period.  
 The multivariate regression model we estimate is as follows: 
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑉𝐶𝑑 + 𝛽2𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑑 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑉𝐶𝑑 ×
𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑑 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑑 + 𝛾𝑑𝑑 + 𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑑                            (7) 
where all variables are as previously defined. The main variable of interest is the interaction 
variable, 𝐷𝑉𝐶𝑑 × 𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑑 , which is introduced to capture the effects of the 
reported increase in periodic auctions following the DVC’s implementation of the liquidity 
proxy, 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑 . The standard errors are robust to autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity. 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
Table 5 reports the estimation results for Equation (7). The estimates are presented for the 
full sample of stocks and by liquidity terciles. Consistent with our hypothesis on the impact of 
increased use of periodic auctions on liquidity (Hypothesis 2), all of the 𝛽1 estimates are 
positive and the two most liquid stock terciles’ coefficients are statistically significant at the 
0.01 level. These estimates indicate that the implementation of the DVC is linked to a widening 
spread and thus a loss of liquidity. This is consistent with the findings of Ibikunle et al. (2019) 
on the effects of the DVC on liquidity, and this is driven by a number of factors, including the 
reduction of order flow competition between lit and dark venues when the dark trading halt is 
restricted. The reduction in order flow competition enables market-makers in lit venues to 
exploit their new-found power to set spreads for trading. This increased leverage or power 
inevitably leads to larger transaction costs and wealth transfer from liquidity-takers to liquidity-
providers (see for example Foucault and Menkveld, 2008; Zhu, 2014; Kwan et al., 2015; Gresse, 
2017).  
A second potential driver is that dark trading restrictions imply the loss of a potential 
trading mechanism, which then leads to counterparties having to queue for liquidity. However, 
in line with Hypothesis 3, the negative and statistically significant 𝛽2 estimates for all but one 
of the regressions reported in the table suggest that liquidity constraints during the sample 
period are alleviated by the opportunity to increase the use of periodic auctions as a trading 
outlet. These estimates apply to the entire sample time series and so they cannot be completely 
disentangled from the effects of the DVC-induced increases in periodic auctions activity 
despite controlling for the DVC. A theoretical explanation for the estimates is that more 
information is released when traders migrate from dark pools to more transparent venues due 
to the improvement of transparency, which in turn triggers more efficient prices and further 
liquidity improvements in the aggregate market (see Amihud et al., 1997; Madhavan, 1992; 
Bloomfield et al., 2015).  
Nevertheless, the improvement in liquidity appears to be less pronounced than the loss of 
liquidity induced by the DVC. For example, the middle and lowest terciles’ 𝛽1 (𝛽2) estimates 
are 0.020 (-0.001) and 0.015 (-0.004) respectively and they are all statistically significant at the 
0.01 level. The estimates show that exploiting periodic auctions only ameliorates the liquidity 
constraints to a small degree. Therefore, it is unsurprising that the 𝛽3 estimate for the full 
sample is positive (0.002) and statistically significant at the 0.01 level, indicating that the 
combined effects of the DVC and the increase in periodic auctions during the dark trading 
restrictions period reflects, on average, a worsening of liquidity for the full sample of stocks. 
The only stocks to buck this trend are the most liquid tercile stocks. This can be explained by 
the fact that the most liquid stocks are usually the most active ones and therefore they are likely 
to be more affected by restrictions on dark trading. Periodic auctions thus provide an 
opportunity to shift unfulfilled hitherto dark orders.  
A similar argument can be made with regard to the effect of trading using the other non-
periodic auctions trading mechanisms captured by the volume variable: the coefficient 
estimates, although generally negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 level, are very 
small in comparison to the liquidity constraining effects of the DVC. Taken together, the 
estimates presented in Table 5 are consistent with the submissions of Johann et al. (2019), who 
find that the introduction of MiFID II regulations, i.e. the DVC, has a negligible impact on 
market liquidity.   
  
4.2.2. Adverse selection analysis 
We next investigate how the periodic auctions dynamics around the DVC impact adverse 
selection costs, a component of the spread. Periodic auctions are often touted as a 
countermeasure against the technological arms race for speed (see Budish et al., 2015; Cboe, 
2018). The arms race in itself has given rise to adverse selection-inducing latency arbitrage 
(see Shkilko and Sokolov, 2020; Ibikunle and Rzayev, 2020; Indriawan et al., 2020), which 
suggests that, consistent with improving liquidity (as shown in Section 4.2.1), a rise in periodic 
auctions across the full sample period could be linked to a reduction in adverse selection costs. 
In order to test this, we estimate the following panel regression model: 
𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑑 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑉𝐶𝑑 + 𝛽2𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑑 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑉𝐶𝑑 ×
𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑑 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑑 + 𝛾𝑑𝑑 + 𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑑                             (8) 
 
where 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑑 is the daily volume-weighted adverse selection in stock 𝑖 on 
day 𝑑 . All other variables are as previously defined, and standard errors are robust to 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity.  
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
Table 6 reports the estimated coefficients for Equation (8). The first main observation is 
that, in line with Hypothesis 5, the DVC decreases the adverse selection in the full sample of 
stocks and terciles; all the coefficient estimates, with the exception of the lowest liquidity 
tercile, are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Although this appears counter-intuitive 
based on the earlier reported results for the liquidity model estimation, the results are consistent 
with the expectation that the implementation of a dark trading halt in stocks will force a transfer 
of slow traders from dark pools to other more transparent venues, such as the continuous (lit) 
market (see Johann et al., 2019). An increase in the number of slow (uninformed) traders in lit 
venues, or at least in less dark venues, will dilute the concentration of informed traders in these 
venues and result in a lowering of the risk of being adversely selected. Furthermore, the impact 
of the DVC on liquidity provision is driven by reduction in order flow competition, which 
allows lit market-makers to set spreads that favor them more, rather than through any increase 
in adverse selection costs.  
The 𝛽2 coefficient estimates indicate that the effects of periodic auctions on adverse 
selection costs are generally weak, with only the most liquid tercile’s coefficient returning a 
statistically significant estimate (-0.01% at a 0.01 level of statistical significance). Although 
this effect, which suggests that Hypothesis 4 is upheld, is likely only relevant to very liquid 
stocks, it is in line with the extensive stream of literature on how call auctions affect the price 
discovery process. There is a clear theoretical argument for congregating all available market 
liquidity at a single point in order to determine the fair price of an instrument. Schwartz (2012) 
asserts that this enhances the accuracy of the price discovery process, while Madhavan (1992) 
argues that since all traders are given access to the same prices at the same time, call auctions 
reduce information asymmetry. Schnitzlein (1996) also finds that there is a reduction in adverse 
selection costs incurred by uninformed traders under a call auction. Although periodic auctions 
occur at much smaller intervals and higher speeds, the theoretical arguments stand given the 
structural similarities between the traditional call auction generally deployed in modern 
financial markets and periodic auctions.  
The interaction term’s coefficient estimates paint a different picture from those offered by 
the 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 estimates, especially for the most liquid tercile stocks. The full sample and 
most liquid tercile 𝛽3 estimates are positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level, a 
complete reversal of the most liquid tercile’s 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 estimates. This suggests that the 
increase in the volume of periodic auction trades observed during the DVC period reverses the 
ameliorating effect of periodic auctions and the DVC on adverse selection costs, thereby 
indicating a nonlinear effect of periodic auctions on adverse selection. The suggestion that 
trading in dark/quasi-dark venues has a nonlinear effect on market quality characteristics is not 
unusual; for example, Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2015) and Aquilina et al. (2017a) report 
nonlinear effects of dark trading on market quality variables. The positive 𝛽3 estimates could 
be linked to hitherto dark trading activity migrating to quasi-dark venues instead of lit venues 
during the DVC window, as Johann et al. (2019) report. This could explain the positive 
relationship between adverse selection and periodic auctions during the DVC, a development 
that is typically associated with a significant reduction in the proportion of transactions 
executed in lit markets (see Aquilina et al., 2017b). The nonlinear effect is also consistent with 
Eom et al. (2007) argument that market quality is an increasing concave function of 
transparency. It is important to note that this effect is not observed in the least liquid stocks 
tercile, with its 𝛽3 estimate returning a negative value of -0.03% (significant at a 0.1 level). 
This is also in line with Aquilina et al. (2017b) reporting a much higher inflection point where 
the negative relationship between adverse selection risk and dark trading in lower volume 
stocks turns positive.  
 
4.2.3. Information efficiency analysis 
We now address the question of how the evolution of periodic auctions related to dark 
trading halts can drive the efficiency of the price discovery process. Evidence on the direct 
effects of periodic auctions on informational efficiency is sparse. However, the extensive body 
of research on the effects of the longer duration call auctions offers some indication of what 
we might expect. In particular, both theoretical and empirical studies (Amihud et al., 1997; 
Madhavan, 1992; Chang et al., 2008; Comerton-Forde et al., 2007) suggest that call auctions 
improve the efficiency of the price discovery process. In order to ascertain how periodic 
auctions impact informational efficiency, we estimate the following panel regression model:  
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑑 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑉𝐶𝑑 + 𝛽2𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑑 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑉𝐶𝑑 ×
𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑑 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑑 + 𝛾𝑑𝑑 + 𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑑                      (9) 
where 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑑  corresponds to one of 𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑑  or 
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑑. All other variables are as previously defined, and the standard errors are 
robust to autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. 
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
Table 7 reports the regression results for Equation (9). For the sake of clarity, we examine 
the results presented in both panels of the table in tandem. The first observation is that all but 
two of the eight 𝛽1  coefficient estimates in both panels are negative and statistically 
significant at conventional levels; the full sample estimates in Panels A and B are -4.50% and 
-10% respectively, and both are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. This suggests that, 
contrary to its effects on liquidity, the imposition of the DVC appears to improve the efficiency 
of the price discovery process. This is likely to be linked to informed traders’ reactions to the 
increased level of transparency induced by the forced migration of hitherto dark order flow to 
more transparent venues. In contrast to the arguments of Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) and 
Madhavan (1995) that informed traders trade more slowly in transparent markets, the increased 
transparency in the aggregate market is linked to improvements in market efficiency. One factor 
that makes the arguments of Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) and Madhavan (1995) rather invalid 
in this case is that informed traders generally face a higher risk of non-execution (see Zhu, 
2014) and delays in darker/less-transparent markets (see Menkveld et al., 2017). Hence, any 
caution informed traders may exhibit in markets that are more transparent is less of an 
impediment to the price discovery process than the non-execution risk and delay associated 
with trading in dark pools. The economic significance of the coefficient estimates is also 
notable, with the full sample’s results suggesting a 10% improvement in the estimated measure 
of informational efficiency. This finding is inconsistent with the ambiguous picture Johann et 
al. (2019) analysis provides. This deviation could be linked to the sample focus: our analysis 
examines only the case for Europe’s most active market across all venue types – the UK – 
while Johann et al. (2019) pan-European focus could potentially contribute to a more internally 
inconsistent observation across various EU member states.  
However, our estimates of the direct effects of periodic auctions on informational 
efficiency present a more ambiguous view that is in keeping with the findings of Johann et al. 
(2019). In Panel B, none of the 𝛽2 estimates are statistically significant at conventional levels, 
indicating that the effect of periodic auctions on informational efficiency is benign at best; 
hence, the 𝛽3 coefficients reflect the effects of the DVC on 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑑 . Another 
theoretical explanation is that more information is released when orders are shifted from dark 
pools to more transparent venues, thereby increasing transparency (see Amihud et al., 1997; 
Madhavan, 1992; Bloomfield et al., 2015). In contrast, in Panel A, which shows the results 
based on 𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑑 as an informational efficiency proxy, the full sample and most 
liquid tercile’s 𝛽2 estimates are positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels 
respectively. The interaction term’s coefficients in Panel A are also positive and statistically 
significant for the full sample and the two upper liquidity terciles. Taken together, the estimates 
in Panel A suggest that the overall effect of periodic auctions trading during the DVC window 
for the stocks it affects is a deviation from a random walk or reductions in informational 
efficiency. Thus, while trading in other (non-dark pool) venues improves price efficiency (as 
shown by the generally negative and statistically significant 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑 coefficient estimates), 
the periodic auctions appear to have the opposite effect. This result can be explained by the 
speed of trading in periodic auctions (even at 100ms intervals). While trading in dark pools 
suggests a degree of delay (as in Menkveld et al., 2017; Zhu, 2014), periodic auctions are 
deliberately designed as mechanisms to make HFT less threatening and slow down trading. It 
is therefore unsurprising that their main effect on the price discovery process is making it less 
efficient, and Hypothesis 6 is upheld. 
 
5. Conclusion 
According to Budish et al. (2015), frequently batching orders and auctioning instruments 
offers an effective solution to address the latency arbitrage and the technological arms race in 
financial markets, as well as the externalities they induce (see Menkveld, 2014). The question 
of how frequently batching and uncrossing needs to take place to maintain or enhance market 
quality remains largely unanswered. In this paper, we exploit recent regulatory developments 
in Europe to investigate the effects of sub-second periodic auctions on market quality 
characteristics in UK-listed stocks. The UK financial markets – the most active trading 
environment in Europe – offer a unique opportunity to assess the direct effects of a shift of 
trading volume towards periodic auctions following the imposition of dark trading restrictions 
on the market. This is crucial because frequent auctioning remains uncommon in financial 
markets. 
Consistent with Johann et al. (2019), we observe that stocks that have had their dark trading 
privileges withdrawn experience higher periodic auctions volumes than matched stocks with 
dark trading privileges. However, the overall market quality effects of periodic auctions are at 
best limited and mixed. We find that for stocks experiencing dark trading halts, periodic 
auctions are linked to a statistically significant reduction in overall market liquidity and an 
increase in adverse selection costs when the DVC is in effect. Controlling for the dark trading 
restrictions suggests that periodic auctions have a generally positive effect on liquidity and a 
largely benign effect on adverse selection costs, except in the case of the most liquid stocks, 
where adverse selection declines in line with periodic auctions. This is consistent with the 
predictions of Budish et al. (2015): that periodic auctions offer a safe haven for slower traders 
who are susceptible to the latency arbitrage trading of faster traders. Thus, a rise in the use of 
periodic auctions lowers the incidence of slower traders being adversely selected.  
The evidence of the impact of periodic auctions on informational efficiency is also mixed. 
Periodic auctions, especially during the DVC window, are linked to a deviation from a random 
walk or reduction in informational efficiency. This finding is in line with periodic auctions 
slowing down the price discovery process. While trading in dark pools implies delays relative 
to trading in lit venues (as in Menkveld et al., 2017; Zhu, 2014), periodic auctions often 
deliberately design a mechanism to slow down trading, i.e. in response to the technological 
arms race or latency arbitrage. 
The mixed nature of the evidence on frequent discrete trading systems is underscored by 
the rise in periodic auctions in Europe, while in Taiwan the TWSE has replaced its discrete 
system with a continuous one (see Indriawan et al., 2020). Therefore, the insights on a new 
breed of discrete trading systems that this study presents demand attention. Indeed, this is also 
a valuable early reference for regulators when considering the trade-offs between continuous 
and discrete trading mechanisms, especially given that the debate on the societal welfare effects 
of technological arms race speed in financial markets continues unabated. Our study offers 
some tentative evidence of the relevance of periodic auctions as a mechanism for addressing 
latency arbitrage and, by extension, the technological arms race.  
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Figure 1. Trading in periodic auctions books and the implementation of the double volume cap 
The figure plots the trading volume, currency volume and number of transactions in European periodic auctions books in relation to the implementation of the first double 
volume cap (DVC) for London Stock Exchange-listed stocks. The orange vertical bars correspond to two events: when MiFID II came into force on 3rd January 2018 and when 
the first DVC suspensions commenced on 12th March 2018. The horizontal plots represent the average stock-level estimates for three periods; grey, yellow and green correspond 
to pre-MiFID II (1st December 2017 to 2nd January 2018), pre-DVC (3rd January to 9th March 2018, a Friday) and DVC periods (12th March to 29th June 2018) respectively. 
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Figure 2. Periodic auctions activity as a percentage of total market activity 
The figure plots the volume, currency volume and transactions of periodic auctions relative to the total market volume for London Stock Exchange-listed stocks and the 
implementation of the first double volume cap (DVC). The orange vertical bars correspond to two events: when MiFID II came into force on 3rd January 2018 and when the 
first DVC suspensions commenced on 12th March 2018. The horizontal plots represent the average periodic overall estimates; grey, yellow and green correspond to pre-MiFID 
II (1st December 2017 to 2nd January 2018), pre-DVC (3rd January to 9th March 2018, a Friday) and DVC periods (12th March to 29th June 2018) respectively. 
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Figure 3. Evolution of outcome variables for treated and control groups 
The figures plot the evolution of three outcome variables (𝑃𝐴𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑, 𝑃𝐴𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑 and 𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑑) prior to and following the implementation of the 
double volume cap (DVC) mechanism. 𝑃𝐴𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑, 𝑃𝐴𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑 and 𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑑 are as defined in Table 1. The sample period covers [-2.5; +3.5 
months] intervals around the DVC. The vertical bar indicates the date of the DVC implementation, 12th March 2019. The treatment group consists of the 57 FTSE 250 stocks 
with DVC restrictions and the control group includes the 57 FTSE 250 stocks with no DVC restrictions. 
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Table 1. Variable definitions 
The table defines the variables employed in this study. 
Variable Unit Definition 
Periodic auctions variables 
𝑃𝐴𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑  Shares Number of shares traded in periodic auctions order books for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑. 
𝑃𝐴𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑  GBX Currency (in GBX) value of the shares traded in periodic auctions order books for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑. 
𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑑 
 Number of transactions recorded in periodic auctions order books for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑. 
Dependent variables 
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑 % 
Relative quoted spread for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑, computed as the volume-weighted average of the difference 
between bid prices and ask prices divided by the average of both prices. 
𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑑 % 
Adverse selection costs for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑, computed as the volume-weighted average of the difference 
between the effective spread and the realized spread divided by the average of bid and ask prices. Trade direction 
is estimated using the Lee and Ready (1991) classification algorithm. 
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑑 
 
Variance ratio for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑, and a proxy for informational efficiency. Computed by taking the absolute 
value of 1 minus a long-term midpoint return variance (5 minutes) divided by a short-term midpoint return 
variance (1 minute) multiplied by five, which is the quotient between the long-term and the short-term. Midpoint 
is the average of bid and ask prices. 
𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑑 
 Autocorrelation for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑, and a proxy for informational efficiency. This is estimated by taking the 
absolute value of the autocorrelation for 5-second midpoint returns on day d. 
Control variables 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑 ‘000 Volume traded in all exchanges (excluding the periodic auctions mechanism) for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑. 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑑 £’000,000 End-of-day market value of stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑. 
𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑑 GBX Close price for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑. 
𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐼𝑚𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑑 
 Order imbalance for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑, computed as the absolute value of the buyer-initiated volume minus the 
seller-initiated volume divided by total volume in stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑. 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑑 
 A proxy for volatility, computed as the variance of one-minute intervals midpoint returns for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑. 
𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑑 




Table 2. Statistics 
In this table, Panel A reports the summary statistics (mean and standard deviation) for all the variables employed in the study, while Panel B presents the results of a statistical 
comparison of the matching criteria for stocks employed in a difference-in-differences estimation. 𝑃𝐴𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑 , 𝑃𝐴𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑 and 𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑑 are 
proxies for periodic auctions activities and are the volume, currency volume and number of transactions in periodic auctions for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑. 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑑 is the end-
of-day close price of stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑. 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑑 is the midpoint return volatility for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑. 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐼𝑚𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑑 proxies order imbalance for stock 𝑖 on 
day 𝑑.  𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑 is the volume of trading (excluding periodic auctions) in stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑. 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑑 is the end-of-day market value of stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑. 
𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑑 is the three-day cumulative abnormal return on closing price for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑. 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑 is the daily volume-weighted average of relative 
quoted spread for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑. 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑑 is the daily volume-weighted average of adverse selection costs for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑. 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑑 is the 
variance ratio for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑, and 𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑑 is the autocorrelation for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑. The sample consists of 215 FTSE 250 stocks trading in London’s 
trading venues between 3rd January and 29th June 2018. The stocks are divided into terciles using currency volume in GBX. 
Panel A. Summary statistics 
Variables 
Full sample Largest tercile Median tercile Smallest tercile 
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. 
𝑃𝐴𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑 87,155.45 239,122.10 47,904.49 185,442.30 71,104.87 191,317.30 141,413.00 308,842.80 
𝑃𝐴𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑 (GBX) 37,455,557 84,829,696 10,051,155 40,604,182 22,688,090 39,854,284 78,938,863 124,795,051 
𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑑 126.824 226.196 33.783 97.326 78.484 121.195 265.846 313.65 
𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑑 (GBX) 1,072.95 2,857.64 1,124.52 4,666.98 747.460 926.17 1,352.15 1,477.17 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑑 0.046 0.274 0.059 0.355 0.036 0.200 0.044 0.246 
𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐼𝑚𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑑 -0.373 26.963 -1.366 36.061 0.265 23.857 -0.055 18.161 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑑 (£’000,000) 1,968.23 1,573.13 956.067 447.842 1,609.82 802.663 3,311.24 1,898.23 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑 (‘000) 1,501.03 2,953.16 616.46 1,377.22 1,206.57 2,057.38 2,655.77 4,206.45 
𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑑 -0.002 0.065 -0.002 0.068 -0.002 0.059 -0.0003 0.046 
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑 0.189 0.169 0.298 0.237 0.165 0.081 0.107 0.076 
𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑑 0.003 0.01 0.005 0.015 0.003 0.008 0.002 0.006 
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑑 0.572 0.322 0.511 0.348 0.601 0.313 0.603 0.297 
𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑑 0.06 0.104 0.043 0.075 0.057 0.1 0.08 0.126 
 
Panel B. Comparative analysis for matched sample of stocks 
Variables Treated group Control group Difference t-statistics 
𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑑 0.049111 0.047691 0.00142 0.624 
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑 0.257 0.216 0.041 -1.531 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑 (‘000) 1,222.827 1,276.462 -53.635 -0.912 
 
  
Table 3. Trading activity in periodic auctions order books 
This table presents estimates of trading activity in periodic auctions order books. 𝑃𝐴𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑, 𝑃𝐴𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑 and 𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑑 are proxies for periodic 
auctions’ trading activities and are the volume, currency volume and number of transactions in periodic auctions for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑. t-statistics for two-sample tests of 
differences between average trading activity of the pre- and post-event periods are also presented. The sample period is from 3rd January to 29th June 2018 and the event date is 
12th March 2018, when the double volume cap mechanism was implemented in European markets. The sample consists of 114 FTSE 250 stocks trading in London’s trading 
venues between 3rd January and 29th June 2018; the control and treated groups of stocks each have 57 stocks. ***, ** and * correspond to statistical significance at the 0.01, 
0.05 and 0.1 levels respectively. 
 Control group Treated group 
Variables 𝑃𝐴𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑  𝑃𝐴𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑  𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑑  𝑃𝐴𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑  𝑃𝐴𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑  𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑑  
Pre-event 11,528.13 5,232,510 25.882 24,880.91 7,158,572 39.245 
Post-event 29,854.03 13,668,073 58.122 139,855.60 39,351,537 118.906 
Difference 18,325.9*** 8,435,563*** 32.24*** 114,974.69*** 32,192,965*** 79.661*** 
t-statistic 10.94 10.84 9.00 22.76 23.99 20.64 
 
  
Table 4. Trading activity in periodic auctions around the DVC 
This table reports the estimated coefficients for the following difference-in-differences regression model: 
𝑃𝐴𝑖,𝑑 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑉𝐶𝑑 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑉𝐶𝑑 × 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑑 + 𝛾𝑑𝑑 + 𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑑 
where 𝑃𝐴𝑖,𝑑 corresponds to one of the log of periodic auctions proxies, i.e. 𝑃𝐴𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑 (Panel A), 𝑃𝐴𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑 (Panel B) and 𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑑 (Panel C), 
for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑. 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 and 𝐷𝑉𝐶𝑑 are dummy variables. 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 takes the value of one if stock 𝑖 is under the double volume cap (DVC)-linked dark trading 
restrictions and zero otherwise. 𝐷𝑉𝐶𝑑 takes the value of one for 12
th March 2018 and subsequent days in the sample and zero otherwise. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑑 contains a series of 
control variables for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑. The variables include the log of 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑, which is the volume of trading (excluding periodic auctions) in stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑, log of 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑑, the end-of-day market value of stock 𝑖 in day 𝑑, 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐼𝑚𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑑, which proxies order imbalance for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑, 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑑, the midpoint 
return volatility for stock 𝑖 in day 𝑑, and 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑑, the three-day cumulative abnormal return on closing price for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑. The others include the log of 
𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑑, the end-of-day closing price for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑 and 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑, a proxy for the level of liquidity in stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑. The sample consists of 114 
FTSE 250 stocks trading in London’s trading venues between 3rd January and 29th June 2018; the control and treated groups of stocks each have 57 stocks. The stocks are 
divided into terciles using currency volume in GBX. ***, ** and * correspond to statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels respectively. 
Panel A  
Dependent variable: log (𝑃𝐴𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑) 




































































































Observations 13,822 4,657 4,585 4,580 
𝑅2̅̅̅̅  0.72 0.742 0.658 0.649 
Stock and time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Panel B 
Dependent variable: log (𝑃𝐴𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑) 




































































































Observations 13,822 4,657 4,585 4,580 
𝑅2̅̅̅̅  0.704 0.735 0.667 0.635 
Stock and time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Panel C 
Dependent variable: log (𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑑) 




































































































Observations 13,822 4,657 4,585 4,580 
𝑅2̅̅̅̅  0.767 0.788 0.737 0.672 
Stock and time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
  
Table 5. The effects of periodic auctions on liquidity 
This table reports the estimated coefficients for the following regression model: 
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑉𝐶𝑑 + 𝛽2log (𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑑) + 𝛽3𝐷𝑉𝐶𝑑 × log (𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑑) + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑑 + 𝛾𝑑𝑑 + 𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑑 
where 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑 is the daily volume-weighted average relative quoted spread for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑 , 𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑑 is the number of periodic auctions 
transactions in stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑. 𝐷𝑉𝐶𝑑 takes the value of one for 12
th March 2018 and subsequent days in the sample and zero otherwise, and 𝑖 and 𝑑 are stock and time 
fixed effects variables respectively. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑑 contains a series of control variables for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑. The variables include the log of 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑, which is the volume 
of trading (excluding periodic auctions) in stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑, log of 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑑, the end-of-day market value of stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑, 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐼𝑚𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑑, which proxies 
order imbalance for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑, 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑑, the midpoint return volatility for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑, 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑑, the three-day cumulative abnormal return on closing 
price for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑, and the log of 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑑, the end-of-day closing price for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑. The sample consists of 158 FTSE 250 stocks trading in London’s 
trading venues between 3rd January and 29th June 2018 that are affected by the double volume cap mechanism triggered on 12th March 2018. The stocks are divided into terciles 
using currency volume in GBX. ***, ** and * correspond to statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels respectively. 
 
Dependent variable: 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑 



























































































Observations 19,165 6,331 6,519 6,315 
𝑅2̅̅̅̅  0.767 0.694 0.534 0.649 
Stock and time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
  
Table 6. The effects of periodic auctions on adverse selection 
The table reports the estimated coefficients for the following regression model: 
𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑑 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑉𝐶𝑑 + 𝛽2log (𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑑) + 𝛽3𝐷𝑉𝐶𝑑 × log (𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑑) + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑑 + 𝛾𝑑𝑑 + 𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑑 
where 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑑 is the daily volume-weighted average of adverse selection costs for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑, 𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑑 is the number of periodic 
auctions transactions in stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑. 𝐷𝑉𝐶𝑑 takes the value of one for 12
th March 2018 and subsequent days in the sample and zero otherwise, and 𝑖 and 𝑑 are stock 
and time fixed effects variables respectively. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑑 contains a series of control variables for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑. The variables include the log of 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑, which is the 
volume of trading (excluding periodic auctions) in stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑, log of 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑑, the end-of-day market value of stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑, 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐼𝑚𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑑, which 
proxies order imbalance for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑, 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑑, the midpoint return volatility for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑, and 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑑, the three-day cumulative abnormal 
return on closing price for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑. The others include the log of 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑑, the end-of-day closing price for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑, and 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑, a 
proxy for the level of liquidity in stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑. The sample consists of 158 FTSE 250 stocks trading in London’s trading venues between 3rd January and 29th June 2018 
that are affected by the double volume cap mechanism triggered on 12th March 2018. The stocks are divided into terciles using currency volume in GBX. ***, ** and * 
correspond to statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels respectively. 
 
Dependent variable: 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑑 




































































































Observations 19,165 6,331 6,519 6,315 
𝑅2̅̅̅̅  0.13 0.19 0.146 0.103 
Stock and time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
  
Table 7. The effects of periodic auctions on informational efficiency 
The table reports the estimated coefficients for the following regression model: 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑑 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑉𝐶𝑑 + 𝛽2log (𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑑) + 𝛽3𝐷𝑉𝐶𝑑 × log (𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑑) + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑑 + 𝛾𝑑𝑑 + 𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑑 
where 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑑 corresponds to one of two proxies for informational efficiency for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑; the two proxies are 𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑑 (Panel A) 
and 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑑 (Panel B). 𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑑 is the number of periodic auctions transactions in stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑. 𝐷𝑉𝐶𝑑 takes the value of one for 12
th March 2018 
and subsequent days in the sample and zero otherwise, and 𝑖 and 𝑑 are stock and time fixed effects variables respectively. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑑 contains a series of control variables 
for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑. The variables include the log of 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑, which is the volume of trading (excluding periodic auctions) in stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑, log of 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑑, 
the end-of-day market value of stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑, 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐼𝑚𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑑, which proxies order imbalance for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑, 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑑, the midpoint return volatility 
for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑 and 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑑, the three-day cumulative abnormal return on closing price for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑. The others include the log of 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑑, the 
end-of-day closing price for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑 and 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑, a proxy for the level of liquidity in stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑. The sample consists of 158 FTSE 250 stocks 
trading in London’s trading venues between 3rd January and 29th June 2018 that are affected by the double volume cap mechanism triggered on 12th March 2018. The stocks 
are divided into terciles using currency volume in GBX. ***, ** and * correspond to statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels respectively. 
Panel A 
Dependent variable: 𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑑 




































































































Observations 19,165 6,331 6,519 6,315 
𝑅2̅̅̅̅  0.097 0.104 0.08 0.041 
Stock and time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Panel B 
Dependent variable: 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑑 




































































































Observations 19,165 6,331 6,519 6,315 
𝑅2̅̅̅̅  0.087 0.08 0.063 0.084 
Stock and time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Appendix A. Stocks employed in this study 
This appendix presents the stocks included in the stock sample, including information of ISINs, 
tickers and company names. 
 
A1. Unrestricted stocks 
Ticker Company Name ISIN 
3IN 3i Infrastructure JE00BF5FX167 
ACA Acacia Mining GB00BYWF9Y76 
ASL Aberforth Smaller Companies Trust GB0000066554 
ATST Alliance Trust GB00B11V7W98 
BGEO Bank of Georgia GB00BF4HYT85 
BGFD Baillie Gifford Japan Trust GB0000485838 
BRWM BlackRock World Mining Trust GB0005774855 
BTEM British Empire Securities & General Trust GB0001335081 
CLDN Caledonia Investments GB0001639920 
CTY City of London Inv Trust GB0001990497 
EDIN Edinburgh Inv Trust GB0003052338 
ELTA Electra Private Equity GB0003085445 
BNKR Bankers Investment Trust Plc GB0000767003 
FCSS Fidelity China Special Situations GB00B62Z3C74 
FGT Finsbury Growth & Income Trust GB0007816068 
FXPO Ferrexpo GB00B1XH2C03 
GCP GCP Infrastructure Investments Ltd JE00B6173J15 
GFRD Galliford Try GB00BKY40Q38 
GFTU Grafton Group IE00B00MZ448 
GPOR Great Portland Estates GB00BF5H9P87 
HICL HICL Infrastructure Company Ltd GB00BJLP1Y77 
INPP International Public Partnership Ltd GB00B188SR50 
INVP Investec Plc GB00B17BBQ50 
JII JPMorgan Indian Inv Trust GB0003450359 
JLIF John Laing Infrastructure Fund Ltd GG00B4ZWPH08 
JMG JPMorgan Emerging Markets Inv Trust GB0003418950 
MCRO Micro Focus International GB00BJ1F4N75 
MNKS Monks Inv Trust GB0030517261 
MRC Mercantile Investment Trust (The) GB00BF4JDH58 
MYI Murray International Trust GB0006111909 
NBLS NB Global Floating Rate Income Fund GG00B3KX4Q34 
NESF NextEnergy Solar Fund GG00BJ0JVY01 
PCT Polar Capital Technology Trust GB0004220025 
PHNX Phoenix Group Holdings (DI) GB00BGXQNP29 
PLI Perpetual Income & Growth Inv Trust GB0006798424 
PNL Personal Assets Trust GB0006827546 
PSH Pershing Square Holdings GG00BPFJTF46 
RCP Rit Capital Partners GB0007366395 
RDI Redefine International IM00BH3JLY32 
RDW Redrow GB00BG11K365 
RHIM RHI Magnesita NL0012650360 
RMV Rightmove GB00BGDT3G23 
RSE Riverstone Energy Limited GG00BBHXCL35 
SCIN Scottish Inv Trust GB0007826091 
SDP Schroder AsiaPacific Fund GB0007918872 
SEQI Sequoia Economic Infrastructure GG00BV54HY67 
HGT HGCapital Trust GB00BJ0LT190 
SSPG SSP Group GB00BGBN7C04 
TMPL Temple Bar Inv Trust GB0008825324 
TRY TR Property Inv Trust GB0009064097 
UKW Greencoat UK Wind GB00B8SC6K54 
VEC Vectura Group GB00BKM2MW97 
VEIL Vietnam Enterprise Investments KYG9361H1092 
VOF Vinacapital Vietnam Opportunity GG00BYXVT888 
WPCT Woodford Patient Capital Trust GB00BVG1CF25 
WTAN Witan Inv Trust GB00BJTRSD38 
WWH Worldwide Healthcare Trust GB0003385308 
 
A2. restricted stocks 
Ticker Company Name ISIN 
AA AA GB00BMSKPJ95 
AGK Aggreko GB00BK1PTB77 
AGR Assura GB00BVGBWW93 
ALM Allied Minds GB00BLRLH124 
ASCL Ascential GB00BYM8GJ06 
ASHM Ashmore Group GB00B132NW22 
AVV Aveva Group GB00BBG9VN75 
BAB Babcock International Group GB0009697037 
BAG Barr (A.G.) GB00B6XZKY75 
BBA BBA Aviation GB00B1FP8915 
BBOX Tritax Big Box Reit GB00BG49KP99 
BBY Balfour Beatty GB0000961622 
BCA BCA Marketplace GB00BP0S1D85 
BEZ Beazley GB00BYQ0JC66 
BME B&M European Value Retail S.A.  LU1072616219 
BOY Bodycote GB00B3FLWH99 
BRW Brewin Dolphin Holdings GB0001765816 
BTG BTG GB0001001592 
BVIC Britvic GB00B0N8QD54 
BWNG Brown (N.) Group GB00B1P6ZR11 
BWY Bellway GB0000904986 
BYG Big Yellow Group GB0002869419 
CAPC Capital & Counties Properties GB00B62G9D36 
CARD Card Factory GB00BLY2F708 
CBG Close Brothers Group GB0007668071 
CCC Computacenter GB00BV9FP302 
CEY Centamin (DI) JE00B5TT1872 
CINE Cineworld Group GB00B15FWH70 
CNE Cairn Energy GB00B74CDH82 
CRST Crest Nicholson Holdings GB00B8VZXT93 
CTEC Convatec GB00BD3VFW73 
CTEC Convatec Group Plc GB00BD3VFW73 
CWK Cranswick GB0002318888 
DCC DCC IE0002424939 
DCG Dairy Crest Group GB0002502812 
DLG Direct Line Insurance Group GB00BY9D0Y18 
DLN Derwent London GB0002652740 
DNLM Dunelm Group GB00B1CKQ739 
DOM Domino's Pizza Group GB00BYN59130 
DPH Dechra Pharmaceuticals GB0009633180 
DPLM Diploma GB0001826634 
DRX Drax Group GB00B1VNSX38 
DTY Dignity GB00BRB37M78 
ECM Electrocomponents GB0003096442 
ELM Elementis GB0002418548 
EMG Man Group GB00B83VD954 
EQN Equiniti Group GB00BYWWHR75 
ERM Euromoney Institutional Investor GB0006886666 
ESNT Essentra GB00B0744359 
ESUR Esure Group GB00B8KJH563 
ETO Entertainment One Limited CA29382B1022 
FDSA Fidessa Group GB0007590234 
FGP FirstGroup GB0003452173 
FRCL Foreign and Colonial Inv Trust GB0003466074 
GFS G4S GB00B01FLG62 
GNC Greencore Group IE0003864109 
GNK Greene King GB00B0HZP136 
GNS Genus GB0002074580 
GOG Go-Ahead Group GB0003753778 
GRG Greggs GB00B63QSB39 
GRI Grainger GB00B04V1276 
GVC GVC Holdings IM00B5VQMV65 
HAS Hays GB0004161021 
HFD Halfords Group GB00B012TP20 
HMSO Hammerson GB0004065016 
HOC Hochschild Mining GB00B1FW5029 
HSV Homeserve GB00BYYTFB60 
HSX Hiscox Limited (DI) BMG4593F1389 
HTG Hunting GB0004478896 
HWDN Howden Joinery Group GB0005576813 
IBST Ibstock GB00BYXJC278 
ICP Intermediate Capital Group GB00BYT1DJ19 
IGG IG Group Holdings GB00B06QFB75 
IMI IMI Plc GB00BGLP8L22 
INCH Inchcape GB00B61TVQ02 
INDV Indivior GB00BRS65X63 
IPF International Personal Finance GB00B1YKG049 
IPO IP Group GB00B128J450 
ISAT Inmarsat GB00B09LSH68 
JAM JPMorgan American Inv Trust GB00BKZGVH64 
JDW Wetherspoon (J.D.) GB0001638955 
JLG John Laing Group GB00BVC3CB83 
JLT Jardine Lloyd Thompson Group GB0005203376 
JUP Jupiter Fund Management GB00B53P2009 
KAZ Kaz Minerals GB00B0HZPV38 
KIE Kier Group GB0004915632 
LMP London Metric Property GB00B4WFW713 
LRD Laird GB00B1VNST91 
LRE Lancashire Holdings Ltd. BMG5361W1047 
MAB Mitchells & Butlers GB00B1FP6H53 
MARS Marston’s GB00B1JQDM80 
MCS Mccarthy & Stone GB00BYNVD082 
MERL Merlin Entertainments GB00BDZT6P94 
MGAM Morgan Advanced Materials GB0006027295 
MGGT Meggitt GB0005758098 
MLC Millennium & Copthorne Hotels GB0005622542 
MONY Moneysupermarket.com Group GB00B1ZBKY84 
MSLH Marshalls GB00B012BV22 
MTO Mitie Group GB0004657408 
NEX National Express Group GB0006215205 
OCDO Ocado Group GB00B3MBS747 
OSB OneSavings Bank GB00BM7S7K96 
PAG Paragon Group Of Companies GB00B2NGPM57 
PAY PayPoint GB00B02QND93 
PDL Petra Diamonds Ltd.(DI) BMG702781094 
PETS Pets at Home Group GB00BJ62K685 
PFC Petrofac Ltd. GB00B0H2K534 
PFG Provident Financial GB00B1Z4ST84 
PMO Premier Oil GB00B43G0577 
PNN PENNON GROUP GB00B18V8630 
PTEC Playtech IM00B7S9G985 
PZC PZ Cussons GB00B19Z1432 
QQ QinetiQ Group GB00B0WMWD03 
RMG Royal Mail GB00BDVZYZ77 
RNK Rank Group GB00B1L5QH97 
ROR Rotork GB00BVFNZH21 
RPC RPC Group GB0007197378 
RRS Randgold Resources Ltd. GB00B01C3S32 
RSW Renishaw GB0007323586 
RTN Restaurant Group GB00B0YG1K06 
SAFE Safestore Holding GB00B1N7Z094 
SAGA Saga GB00BLT1Y088 
SCT Softcat GB00BYZDVK82 
SGC Stagecoach Group GB00B6YTLS95 
SHB Shaftesbury GB0007990962 
SHI SIG GB0008025412 
SHP Shire Plc JE00B2QKY057 
SKY Sky GB0008220112 
SMP St. Modwen Properties GB0007291015 
SMWH WH Smith GB00B2PDGW16 
SNR Senior GB0007958233 
SPI Spire Healthcare Group GB00BNLPYF73 
SPX Spirax-Sarco Engineering GB00BWFGQN14 
SRP Serco Group GB0007973794 
STJ St James's Place GB0007669376 
SVS Savills GB00B135BJ46 
SXS Spectris GB0003308607 
SYNT Synthomer GB0009887422 
TALK TalkTalk Telecom Group GB00B4YCDF59 
TATE Tate & Lyle GB0008754136 
TCG Thomas Cook Group GB00B1VYCH82 
TED Ted Baker GB0001048619 
TEP Telecom Plus GB0008794710 
TLW Tullow Oil GB0001500809 
TPK Travis Perkins GB0007739609 
UDG UDG Healthcare Public Ltd. IE0033024807 
ULE Ultra Electronics Holdings GB0009123323 
UTG Unite Group GB0006928617 
VCT Victrex plc GB0009292243 
VED Vedanta Resources GB0033277061 
VM Virgin Money Holdings (UK) GB00BD6GN030 
VSVS Vesuvius GB00B82YXW83 
WEIR Weir Group GB0009465807 
WG Wood Group (John) GB00B5N0P849 
WIZZ Wizz Air Holdings JE00BN574F90 
WKP Workspace Group GB00B67G5X01 
WMH William Hill GB0031698896 
 
 
